Research on Application of Broad Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Dispute Settlement Matters under BITs by 陈高晨
学校编码：10384                              分类号_______密级 ______  








Research on Application of Broad 
Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Dispute 




指导教师姓名： 李 国 安 教 授  
专 业 名 称： 法律硕士（非法学）  
论文提交日期： 2 0 1 3 年 4  月  
论文答辩时间： 2 0 1 3 年   月  
学位授予日期： 2 0 1 3 年    月  
 
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：            

























































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 























    本文共有三章： 




    第二章：最惠国待遇条款的适用限制。从条约和争端解决条款两方面对最惠
国条款适用的限制，来论证宽泛的最惠国待遇条款不能适用于争端解决程序事
项。 





















Most-Favored-Nation Clause generally applies to the substantive matters . 
But in recent years, there are some foreign investors tried to invoke 
Most-Favored-Nation Clause to startup dispute settlement mechanisms 
stipulated in the treaties with a third state, in  order to extend the applicable  
scope of Most-Favored-Nation Clause to procedural matters. And in arbitral 
practice of international investment, some international tribunals had made 
enlargement explain for applicable scope of Most-Favored-Nation Clause. In 
such circumstance, it is necessary to discuss whether Most-Favored-Nation 
Clause can apply to dispute settlement matters and what China can do to deal 
with this problem. 
In this thesis, the author firstly analyzes the difference between the two 
lines of opinion within the international investment arbitral practice, and then 
figure out what is the essential  point with this problem and dangers have been 
arisen from this application. Finally, makes suggestions for China to deal with 
the issue. The thesis is divided into three chapters.  
Chapter one: practice of application of Most-Favored-Nation Clause in 
investment dispute settlement. Then point out what is the essential matter in 
this issue. 
Chapter two: analyze what limits the application of Most-Favored-Nation 
Clause, in order to get reach the point that Most-Favored-Nation Clause cannot 
change the condition to access to the right under BIT, whether substantive right 
or procedural right. That is, it cannot utilize Most-Favored-Nation Clause to 
invoke the dispute settlement provision from a third treaty into the basic treaty.  
Chapter three: analyze the reason why the international investment arbitral 
practice approved the application extend to procedural matters, while it has 













Then according to international tendency and present situation of China, give 
some advices to China to prevent from this application by international tribunal.  
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权范围内。于是，也可以说仲裁庭赞成最惠国待遇条款适用于争端解决事项，规避 18 个月国内救济期限。 
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